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Omission of Realty in Probate Administration*
By R. G. PATTON**
As chairman for several terms of the Probate Division of the
American Bar Association and of its committee which drafted the
Model Probate Code,' the writer could not help but observe that
the probate codes of some states omitted provisions essential to
complete coverage of the subject. The most common was a lack
of provision for adjudication in the court of probate of the parties
constituting the decedents heirs or the parties constituting the
donees of a class gift.
2
The title to the real estate of a testate or intestate owner vests
in the devisee or in the heir, as the case may be, at death of the
owner.3 The personalty goes to the executor or administrator 4 but
the latter usually has nothing to do with administering the realty
other than to collect the rent therefrom or to make a sale when
necessary to pay debts, legacies or costs of administration of the
estate. On the basis of these fundamental principles, the statutes
of some states contemplate that only the personalty shall be in-
cluded in the inventory.6 In others, though included in the in-
ventory, it forms no portion of the administration assets and is
not mentioned except when needed to pay claims, legacies or
administration expenses.1 When there is no such need for the
executor or administrator to make use of decedents real estate,
there is in theory no need of its express inclusion in the probate
of his will and no need for probate of his estate if he dies inte-
* For a companion article by the author on Improvement of Probate Statutes,
see IowA L. REv., Spring Issue 1954.
** Referee, Land Title Calendar of the District Court, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota; former Director of Division of Probate Law, American Bar Association.
'MoEr. PROBATE CODE (Callaghan & Co., 1946).
'Some years ago, a comparable hiatus was found in the penal codes of some
states when there occurred a first case of kidnapping; the only crime chargeable
against the offender was assault.
'Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931); Bass v. Adkinson,
280 Ky. 548, 133 S.W. 2d 921 (1939); Tarr v. Robinson, 158 Pa. 60, 27 At.
859 (1893); 4 PAGE ON WMLS (3d Ed. 1941) sec. 1404; Id., sec. 1586, n. 9.
'ATmsON ON WiLLS secs. 115, 122 (2d Ed., 1953).
'Id., see. 123.
'Examples: N.C. GEN. STAT. (1943) sec. 28-50; TENN. CODE (1932) sec.
8189. Cf. Ky. REv. STAT. (1953) sec. 395.250 (no specific requirement).
'Example, IowA CODE (1950) sec. 635.23,
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state; at death his realty passes to his successors by virtue of a
will or by the laws of descent. Probate of the estate, or expiration
of a statutory period for enforcement of claims will show whether
the realty may be subject to liability for the decedents debts.
The probate of a will which specifically devises a particular tract
of land may serve as a muniment in the chain of title without any
judicial construction provided, as in the case of any muniment,
its terms are too clear to be in need of construction. But when
the devise is to a class, or when the owner dies intestate, or
intestate as to land to which the title is under examination, some-
thing more is required than a mere clearance from probate claims.
The needed additional record may relate to one or more of several
items: adjudication as to who constitute the decedent's heirs,
whether the land involved was or was not his homestead, who
constitute the members of a class to which land is devised, or
who constitute the residuary beneficiaries, differing in different
successions. Without this, probate of the deceased owner's estate
has fulfilled part only (often only a proof of death) of what is
necessary to make a record of a transfer of title based upon suc-
cession at death of the owner.
Various devices have been used to overcome this hiatus in
chains of title. The most common is the use of affidavits to estab-
lish the fact of death, intestacy and the parties comprising the
decedent's heirs. Without a statute on the subject they usually
have no evidentiary value8 and can at most serve as an estoppel
against the affiant.9 However several states have provided that
the record of an affidavit of death and heirship constitutes prima
facie proof thereof.10 In some states, the record cannot be im-
peached after it has existed without attack for a specified period
of time." Prior to adoption of the present Kansas probate code,
which provides for a decree determining the succession to owner-
'Reeves v. Roberts, 294 Mo. 593, 242 S.W. 956 (1922); Myrick v. Leddy,
37 S.W. 2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
Evidentiary value independent of statute: Attebery v. Blair, 244 Il1. 363, 91
N.E. 475, 135 Am. St. Rep. 342 (1910); Perry v. Ritze, 110 Neb. 286, 193 N.W.
758 (1923).
'Asbach v. Chicago, B. & I. Ry. Co., 86 Iowa 101, 53 N.W. 90 (1892).
11 Colorado Laws (1941), c. 182, sec. 1; Idaho Laws (1945), c. 84; Ky. REv.
STAT. (1953) see. 382.120; TEN. ANN. CODE (1934) sec. 8350; Wis. STAT.
(1951) see. 235.46.
" Florida Laws, 1941, c. 20954, p. 2504 (7 years allowed to prove other-
wise); IoWA CODE (1950), sec. 558.8 (after 3 years the presumption is conclusive).
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ship of the decedents real property,12 it was the general practice
in that state to prove descent by a recorded affidavit, 3 and this
appears to be the current practice in several states. 4
Another method of showing of record that the grantors in a
deed are the heirs of the record owner is by a recital to that effect
in the deed. To a limited extent, such recitals have been made
prima facie evidence of the facts recited, 5 and in a few states
limitation statutes bar all rights inconsistent with the recitals
after the deeds have been of record a designated period of time."0
However in the absence of an adequate statute, or of any statute,
on the subject, these recitals are not competent evidence of either
the death of the owner or as to the parties constituting his heirs.17
In Iowa, the list of heirs filed by the administrator in conclud-
ing administration of the estate of an intestate is commonly
treated as a determination of heirship.' Although the Iowa court
has said by way of dictum that the list of heirs is presumed to
be correct,' 9 the approval of the final report does not amount to
an adjudication on that point and does not estop an unmentioned
heir or his creditors from asserting the rights of said heir in the
decedent's property.20 As has been stated as to the statutes of
that state, "where heirs claims under one who dies intestate and
... where there is a devise to a class under a will, the members
of which are ascertainable at the death of the testator, a statute
making the final report of the administrator and the executor con-
clusive is needed."21
But a better method of establishing the transmission of title at
death of an owner is by including among the final steps of ad-
ministration the entry of an order determining the heirs or de-
" KAN. GEm. STAT. (1949) secs. 59-2249, 59-2251.
'Schmidt v. Fronton, 112 Kan. 585, 211 Pac. 680 (1928).
"States listed in notes 10, 11 supra.
Mo. STAT. ANN. see. 1687, p. 3979.
"IOWA CODE, see. 10079.
McCarthy v. Rochel, 85 Iowa 427, 52 N.W. 861 (1892); Wolf v. Holton,
104 Mich. 107, 62 N.W. 174 (1895); Scott v. Mangrum, 7 Tenn. App. 487 (1928).
"Ladd and Brooke, Decree in Probate Proceedings, 16 IowA L. REv. 195
at 199 (1980).
'Sutherland v. Briggs, 182 Iowa 1170, 1179, 166 N.W. 477, 479 (1918).
However in the case of estates where the personal property is all consumed in the
payment of claims and costs of administration, there may be no occasion to list
the heirs. Under that situation the probate proceeding is of no aid in determining
the heirs who have succeeded to the title of the decedent to unadministered real
estate.
Crosley v. Calhoun, 45 Iowa 557 (1877).
' Tadd and Brooke, op. cit. supra n. 18, p. 202,
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visees, as the case may be, of the decedent. Provision for this
appears in statutes of Arizona, 2 California, 3 Idaho,24 Kansas, 25
Michigan,20 Minnesota,27 Montana,2 3 Nebraska, 9 Nevada,30 North
Dakota,3' Oklahoma,32 South Dakota,83 Utah,34 Vermont, 5 Wis-
consin, 6 and Wyoming. 7
The jurisdiction of the probate courts extends to the real estate
of a decedent the same as to his personalty3 and they can and
should serve the purpose of determining succession as well as the
purpose of administering a decedent's assets for the benefit of his
creditors or legatees. This was fully recognized in the Model
Probate Code3 drafted by the American Bar Association. The
Code provides 40 that "after all claims against the estate ... have
been finally determined and paid, except contingent and un-
matured claims which cannot be paid, the personal representa-
tive shall . . . render his final account and at the same time
petition the court to decree the final distribution of the estate....
In its decree.., the court shall designate the persons to whom
distribution is to be made.... Every tract of real property so
distributed shall be specifically described therein.... The decree
... shall be a conclusive determination of the persons who are
the successors in interest to the estate of the decedent.... It shall
operate as the final adjudication of the transfer of the right, title
and interest of the decedent to the distributees therein desig-
nated .... Whenever the decree . . . includes real property, a
certified copy thereof shall be recorded by the personal repre-
sentative in every county of this state in which any real property
Auz. CODE (1939), sees. 38-1504, -1505, -2008.
CAL. PROB. CODE AN. (Deering 1944), sees. 1020-1022.
TInAHO LAWS ANN. (1943), sees. 15-1306, -1307, -1515.
' KAN~. GEN. STAT. (Supp., 1943), sec. 59-2249.
T M iCH. STAT. ANN. (1943), sees. 27.3178(165), (166).
MnqN. STAT. ANN. (1941), sees. 525.481, .483.
,
8 MONT. REv. CODE (1935), sees. 10327, 10328, 10371.
"NEB. 1Ev. STAT. (1943), sees. 30-1302, -1303.
' NEv. CoMP. LAws (Supp. 1941), sees. 9882.233, .243, .244.
' N.D. REv. CODE (1943), sees. 30-2110, -2111.
" OKLA. STAT. (1941), sees. 631, 632, 711.
' S.D. CODE (1939), sees. 35.1705, .1708, .0117.
UTAH CODE (1943), sees. 102-12-7, -8, 102-14-16.
"VT. PuB. LAws (1933), sees. 2974, 3000.
'Wis. STAT. (1943), see. 318.06, subd. 4.
'Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931), sees. 88-3601, -3602.
"Bengtson v. Setterberg, 227 Minn. 337, 35 N.W. 2d 623 (1949).
MODEL PNOBATE CODE (Callaghan & Co., 1946).
"Id. see. 183.
KENTucKY LAW JouRNAL
distributed by the decree is situated." As stated in a comment,
"the decree of final distribution... is the significant muniment of
title.... No one should, or is likely, to purchase real estate in
reliance upon a will, even though it has been admitted to probate;
but he will rely solely on the recorded certified copy of the decree
of distribution." On the basis of a similar statute, Standard No.
24 of the Title Standards adopted by the Minnesota State Bar
Association provides that "a decree of distribution contrary to the
terms of an admitted will or statutes of descent makes a title un-
marketable during the time allowed for appealing from the de-
cree; but in the absence of an appeal, such title becomes market-
able after the time allowed for appeal has expired." Numerous
local decisions are cited as authority for the standard41 but the
principle embodied in the standard is of general application.42
The record of the decree affords a conclusive 43 adjudication as
to the parties who took title at death of the former owner and
affords a dependable muniment in the chain of title.
Following the statutory procedures provided in twenty-five
states,44 the Model Probate Code further provides4' that inde-
pendent of any administration of the assets of a decedent, the
probate court may determine his heirs when such time has elapsed
since his death that all claims against his estate have been barred
by limitation. A digest of the state statutes on the subject is set
forth in the published code. 46
In view of what can be done in the way of providing statutory
procedures for the determination by the probate court of suc-
cession of a decedents heirs or devisees to his real estate, it seems
unjustified that they or their vendees should continue to be
obliged in any jurisdiction to depend upon deed recitals, affidavits
or inquiries in pais.
'St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. Kenney, 97 Minn. 150, 106 N.W. 344 (1906); In
re Estate of John Eklund, 174 Minn. 28, 218 N.W. 235 (1928); Bengtson v.
Setterberg, supra note 38.
"Moor v. Vawter, 84 Cal. App. 678, 258 Pac. 622 (1927); In re Baxter's
Estate, 98 Mont. 291, 39 P. 2d 186 (1934); In re White's Estate, 256 Wis. 467,
41 N.W. 2d 776 (1950); see also ATKINsoN, WuLLs 798 (2d Ed., 1950).
See cases at nn. 41, 42 supra.
"MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra, pp. 366-368.
Id., sec. 195.
,Id., pp. 369-375.
